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On the subject of reliabil i ty and approaches to its achievement, I 
guess thousands of papers  have been written and thousands of speeches 
and presentations have been delivered in the past  ten years .  A s  a mat te r  
of fact ,  bare ly  any issue in recent  years  has  prompted as many heated 
debates which have been ca r r i ed  through with almost  religious fanat ic ism 
as the reliabil i ty question. These debates have focused mainly on reliabil i ty 
philosophies and concepts, on definitions: what is reliabil i ty after all ? ,  
on the m e r e  mathematical  - o r  be t te r ,  the analytical - approach vs .  common 
engineering prac t ices .  In the discussions,  both par t ies  usually went to the 
ex t remes  and the meetings finally ended without any tangible resu l t s .  Both 
par t ies  departed to  their  desks,  drawing boards and shops with ill feelings. 
I have been in many of these meetings,  siding with the practical  engineer 
because we have a hardware job to do, always with a tough time schedule 
and very  l imited funds, with the hardware complex and i t  the boundary of 
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known t e c hn ol og y . 
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' Now, were these discussions really so  frui t less  as they seemed to b e ?  
'On the way home a f t e r  the meetings I could not get r id  of some points the 
guy on the other side of the fence was making - -  something sunk into m e  
and my  rigid concept s tar ted to become somewhat weakened. Of course ,  
a hard-core  man  does not admit that to the outs iders  - but I admitted it 
to myself and to my  associates .  The most difficult task was to 
convince our design and laboratory engineers and those of some of our 
contractors  that, for  instance,  detail  analysis of components and subsystems,  
the study of character is t ic  failure modes, the application of mathematical  
models ,  the use of logic d iagrams,  the establishment of relative reliability 
numbers  o r  ranges of numbers ,  e t c . ,  a r e  helpful and necessary  tools 
for  obtaining high probabilities of mission success .  Now what could 
management do to introduce these tools ? 
W e  a t  Marshal l  s e t  up a reliability group under the technical top 
management mainly for establishing guidelines, policies,  and concepts. 
Simultaneously we established reliability groups under each Division Director  
in the var ious disciplines such as mechancial design, e lectr ical  design, 
guidance and control,  quality assurance,  e tc .  We insis ted,  however, 
that these groups consist  of men who had a good background in hardware 
development. 
to work direct ly  with our engineers in Huntsville. 
At the same time we hired a reliability contractor who had 
This integration into our 
operation of contractor personnel,  who could demonstrate  by day-to-day ha rd  
work to the hardware designer - and not m e r e l y  by talking philosophy, 
helped greatly.  
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W e ;  together with that contractor ,  analyzed a l ready  designed components, 
and especially subsystems,  and we could show where,  for instance,  
redundancy would increase  reliability or where other methods of operation 
of a subsystem would decrease  the possibility of malfunction. 
up logic d iagrams for component and subsystem functions which, I believe, 
a r e  excellent tools for analyzing a situation. 
this has  been a common method but, surprisingly,  the mechanical design 
engineer in the past made little use of it. 
on the component level,  se t  up preferred par t s  l i s t s ,  qualification p rograms ,  
etc.  
into our operation worked out better than I had dared  to hope, so  we felt  
that we could dissolve the group reporting direct ly  to  our top management 
and give the job to our Quality Assurance and Reliability Laboratory for  
the whole Center .  
Of course ,  in accepting some of the mathematical  and analytical 
methods we did not abolish good old engineering principles whatsoever. 
I do not believe that - a t  leas t  in  the ear l ie r  days of our fight for the common 
engineering approach - we made too much of an  impact on the theoretical  
people on the other side of the fence with our arguments .  
together with the pr ime contractor,  conducted a ve ry  successful reliabil i ty 
program based on sound engineering practice on the Pershing Guided Missi le  
for the Army,  this did not come into the limelight too much. 
Saturn I launch vehicle whose reliability - a t  that t ime before the f i r s t  
launching - was questioned by reliability theoreticians.  The f i r s t  t ask  
We se t  
To the electronic engineer 
We ar ranged  design reviews 
This instigation and penetration program of reliabil i ty consciousness 
Although we, 
It was the big 
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assigned to the reliabil i ty company which I mentioned before was to come 
'up with a figure of inherent reliability on the f i r s t  stage of the Saturn I 
launch vehicle design. Due to the engine-out capability designed into the 
8-engine c lus te r ,  and due to the fact that the H-1 engine is a simplified 
vers ion of the well-proven Atlas f i r s t  stage engine, the Jupi ter  and the 
Thor engine, in combination with other factors ,  the mechanical par t  
came out quite well - not so ,  the electr ical  par t .  
based on lack of numbers for  our design, had taken into i t s  calculations 
The reliabil i ty company, 
figures a t  that t ime common to electronic components, especially a s  to 
connectors,  re lays ,  etc.  We could show that the par t icular  components 
selected for the Saturn I guidance, control, wiring, power supply, 
t e lemet ry ,  e t c . ,  were  well proven in other sys tems and had excellent 
r eco rds ,  o r  that new pa r t s  were designed on sound engineering principles.  
The final study yielded a fair ly  good reliability figure of somewhere close 
to . 766 for  the one-stage vers ion of the Saturn I sys tem pr ior  to f i r s t  
flight. This was to the su rp r i se  of some of the m o r e  theoretically 
inclined reliabil i ty people who s t i l l  believed that there  might be a high 
probability that the vehicle would blow up a t  lift-off or  during the ea r ly  
par t  of i t s  flight. A s  you all know, i t  did not, although no mathematical  
reliabil i ty model was applied in i t s  design, but mainly good engineering 
principles and sober  engineering judgment. W e  applied a good qualification 
program and a s ses smen t  of all components and subsystems and we had an 
excellent inspection, quality control and assurance  program based on the 
principles which la te r  became a salient par t  of the NASA N P C  documents 
200-1, - 2 ,  and - 3 .  
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This success  proved our point to the extremists  of the mathematical  
. model community and made a noticeable impact on them, too, a s  we became - 
impressed  by some of their  analytical approaches which we la te r  applied 
extensively to the Saturn I 2-stager.  
In telling you, maybe somewhat too e labora te ly ,  this s tory  of the 
past ,  I jus t  wanted you to know we went thrnugh the reliability struggle 
I feel  you a l l  had, m o r e  o r  less, in your own plants o r  program offices. 
We a t  Marshal l  Space Flight Center ,  together with our pr ime contractors  
in the Saturn lacnch vehicles for  the Apollo program,  have now a r r ived  a t  
a ra ther  c lear  concept on how to achieve high reliabil i ty,  o r  r a the r ,  
on how to obtain high probability of mission success .  
the application of sound and knowledgeable engineering and engineering 
judgment - le t  m e  repeat the word "engineering judgment" - based on 
long-range experience and supported by all the analytical tools I have 
mentioned before,  such as detailed analysis of each component and sub- 
sys tem,  logic d iagrams,  mathematical models ,  e tc .  , and then most  
important ,  an exhaustive qualification tes t  p rogram,  system tes t s  program,  
and a quality assurance  program according to NASA manuals NPC 200-1, - 2 ,  
- 3  and NPC 250-1 for reliability. 
and the mentioned documents which a re  spelled out in the contract ,  each 
p r ime  contractor establishes his own reliability program.  We d iscuss  
these programs in  detail  with him but we do not, and should not, insis t  
that each contractor plan and execute it exactly the same  standard way. 
It i s ,  in one sentence,  
Based on Marsha l l ' s  general  guidelines 
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We-feel that the contractor should have room for  his  own initiative and 
- imagination. 
With this general  approach w e  were able to demonstrate  nine 
successful mission completions of the Saturn I launch vehicle out of nine 
launchings. Based on this record  I am confident that the 10th launching, 
which happens to be tomorrow,  will also be successful.  
the Saturn I program with ten successes  out of ten - I hope. 
this does not mean that the Saturn I launch vehicle now has  a proven 
100% miss ion  reliability in the statist ical  meaning of the word. 
constraints  of t ime and funding, we were not able to run s ta t is t ical  
reliabil i ty tes t s  of all components with the proper quantity for  establishing 
r e a l  meaningful reliability figures but we can make the statement that - 
considering a l l  these program restraints  - everything feasible was done 
to make the Saturn I a s  highly reliable a s  possible and we would have had 
utmost confidence that each manned space flight miss ion  flown on this 
launch vehicle would have been succe s sful. 
This then concludes 
Of cour se ,  
Due to 
-
During the execution of the Saturn I program we had - among 
minor  difficulties - two salient occurrences which I think a r e  worthwhile 
to reca l l  briefly in context with this reliability conference - one on engine- 
out and the other on s t r e s s  corrosion.  
In order  to tes t  whether the engine-out scheme on the 8-engine cluster  
of the f i r s t  stage would work, we, in one of the ea r l i e r  flights, deliberately 
cut off one engine. 
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It worked well, but we hopefully thought that this scheme would never have 
.to be enacted. However, due to a malfunctioning gear  box of an older 
design vers ion,  we lost  one engine during the sixth flight of Saturn I. 
If I r emember  cor rec t ly ,  i t  was after about 90  seconds o r  so of flight. 
We would have lost  the whole mission had the sensors  and the cut-off 
of this par t icular  engine not worked properly and the guidance sys tem not 
cor rec ted  out the deviation f rom the nominal t ra jec tory  caused by the 
loss  of this engine. 
inherent reliabil i ty designed into the system had saved the mission although 
a weak component had been flown. 
We real ly  obtained the proper  orbit .  In this case  the 
The other case: During a pressure  tes t  a t  Cape Kennedy a c rack  in the 
LOX dome on one engine of the f i r s t  stage became apparent.  
revealed that there  was a case  of s t r e s s  corrosion and we found beginnings 
of s t r e s s  corrosion a l so  in the LOX domes of some of the other engines. 
W e  pulled all the engines, and retrofitted them with new LOX domes 
f rom forgings of a more  s t r rdd  corrosion res i s tan t  mater ia l .  
shows that no reliability approach or concept could have helped us  because 
when this engine was designed the best  mater ia l  of s t r e s s  corrosion 
res i s tance  known at that t ime was selected and the forging, machining 
and heat t reatment  process  was well controlled. 
An investigation 
This example 
In the meant ime,  progress  
in the technological s ta te-of-ar t  a s  to  s t r e s s  corrosion w a s  made. 
In both cases  we and the contractor knew the weaknesses of these 
components but, due to t ime p res su re  and long lead t imes  involved, 
we decided to take the seemingly small  r i sk  to fly them in the unmanned 
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ver-sion of the Saturn I because many of these types of gear  boxes and 
many of these types of LOX domes had been tested and flown successfully 
before.  
With the experience and knowledge gained by Marshal l  Space Flight 
Center and i ts  contractor team, and with the application of manyof the 
same o r  s imi la r  pa r t s ,  components, subsystems and sys tems f rom the 
Saturn I program,  we a r e  going into the Saturn IB and Saturn V programs 
with g rea t e r  confidence. 
I don't  think it i s  necessary  to describe to you the technical 
features  of these launch vehicles,  how they function, and how they will 
be used,  
out, however,  that the planning for these two launch vehicle c l a s ses  of 
the Apollo program is markedly different f rom eve ry  other manned 
space flight program and f rom the Saturn I. The Redstone Missile and the 
Atlas Missile together had close to  200 flights before their  use a s  boosters  
on the Mercury program.  Also, the Titan I1 had a long record  of successful 
tes t  flights a s  a weapon sys tem before the f i r s t  manned Gemini mission was 
flown. 
I presume this audience knows a l l  about this.  Let me point 
The t ime schedule for the manned lunar landing mission does not 
allow such a number of tes t  flights for the development of the Saturn IB and 
Saturn V. In addition, the high cost  per launching of the huge Saturn V is 
prohibitive, On the other hand, the reliability goals for these two vehicles 
serving the extremely complex manned lunar miss ion  have to be a s  close to  
the figure ' 'one" a s  possible. 
ea r ly ,  s tar t ing with the very 
Moreover, we have to  shoot for these goals 
f i r s t  f l ight .  
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The few unmanned launchings allowed prior to the manned ones each c a r r y  
important spacecraf t  missions in addition to the launch vehicle development 
missions.  
aspec ts .  
experience and knowledge by failure during lift-off and flight. 
mandatory that preparations for flight and countdown proceed as flawlessly 
as possible.  
especially of the Saturn V ,  you will realize the enormous challenge of this 
program with regard  to the reliability problem. 
In other words,  every  launching has  to be successful  in all -
We cannot permit  ourselves the luxury of learning and gaining 
It is even 
If you add to these requirements the complexity and s ize ,  
Right f rom the outset it  can be stated that a c lass ica l  reliability 
tes t  p rogram resulting in a s ta t is t ical  reliability figure and the proof of 
numer ica l  reliability goals by testing is not in the ca rds  for a l l  components 
and sys t ems .  We will, however, conduct such tes t  p rograms wherever 
feasible,  especially in the a r e a  of small  components. 
components and their  proper function under prevailing environmental 
conditions will be established by a thorough qualification tes t  program and 
by testing them within the system. Considering the constraints we have 
to live under in the program,  I do  not believe that we can ever  prove an  
established numerical  reliability goal, 
Confidence in l a rge r  
In the following I will now briefly touch on the various hardware 
groups and sys tems and give some few examples of our approach to 
achieving high reliability: 
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1.. Launch vehicle stages 
F o r  the development of each stage we have in principle established 
five full-size ground tes t  stages in the program; namely, a stage for  s t ruc tura l  
testing, a stage f o r  dynamic testing, a stage for checkout of the launch 
facil i t ies a t  Cape Kennedy a s  to i ts  compatibility with the launch vehicle, 
a battleship stage for ea r ly  hot testing of the main propulsion sys tem,  and an 
a l l - sys tems stage,  
configuration of the stages for the f i rs t  flight and is then used for continuing 
development, engineering e f for t ,  and improvement of components and 
subsystems in the environment of the overall  sys tem.  
important for establishing confidence in the hardware and i ts  proper  function. 
The tes t  activity will continue throughout the program. 
saw a par t icular  need of s t ruc tura l  testing under cryogenic conditions. 
For th i s ,  an additional stage of full size diameter  but shor te r  length was 
built.  
2. Instrument Unit 
This la t ter  stage is for hot s ta t ic  testing of the 
This stage is most  
In the S-I1 stage we 
This unit, which i s  a 3-foot high ring sitting on top of the s tages ,  i s  
the b ra in  of the launch vehicle. It contains guidance and control equipment, 
e lec t r ica l  power supply and distribution, te lemetry and tracking equipment, 
e tc .  Here  we have a s imi la r  approach as in the s tages ;  namely,  the 
manufacturing of a number of full s i z e  ground tes t  units,  some of them 
fully equipped - some of them partially. Par t icu lar  emphasis  is given to 
s t ruc tu ra l  testing, vibration testing, systems testing, compatibility testing 
with the S-IVB stage,  and especially with the ground equipment for automatic 
checkout . 10 
3 . .  Overal l  launch vehicle 
F o r  the dynamic behavior of the total  configuration during the 
flight we mount the entire full-  s ize  space vehicle, including spacecraf t  
dummies,  in a dynamic tes t  tower and expose i t  to vibration. 
tes t  s tages  and ground tes t  instrument units a r e  used in this tes t .  
yields us  natural  frequencies,  the bending modes,  control sys tem responses ,  
e tc .  
The dynamic 
It 
The facility stages and a tes t  instrument unit, assembled to make 
up a complete Saturn V ,  a r e  pr imari ly  used for checkout of the launch 
facility, as I mentioned before. 
compatibility of launch vehicle and launching s i te ,  
and weaknesses in design on vehicle connections and sys t ems ,  as well as 
on mechanical and electr ical  ground support equipment, will be revealed. 
Planned operational procedures ,  for instance, for propellant loading, 
handling of the vehicle, will be exercised,  reviewed, and changed. We call  
this facil i ty vehicle the "Wet Tes t  Bird. 
4.  Automatic checkout equipment 
This is a n  essent ia l  s tep  for  establishing 
There shortcomings 
Within the time allotted to m e  for this presentation i t  is not possible 
to  explain to you the scheme and concept of how the automatic checkout of 
s tages  and instrument unit works and what equipment is involved. However, . 
since this checkout method, among other advantages, eliminates to a 
g rea t  extent the human e r r o r ,  I think it should be mentioned in this 
presentation. The pr ime contractors ,  in their  plant checkout before captive 
acceptance testing and in their  final checkout before shipping, a r e  using this 
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automatic equipment which i s  compatible with the checkout equipment a t  
- Cape Kennedy. In o rde r  to guarantee this, to develop the sys tem,  to 
make i t  compatible with the instrument unit, to tes t  the hardware of the 
sys tem,  to  work out overall  checkout procedures,  to t r a in  operators  and 
for var ious other purposes ,  especially in the field of sys tems integration, 
a sys tems development facility for  this automatic checkout equipment of the 
Saturn IB and V is a t  the present  being built up a t  Huntsville. 
In the mechanical field of ground equipment I want to mention one 
par t icular  a r e a  which can cause trouble and lead to catastrophic fa i lures .  
These a r e  the mechanical connections between the umbilical  tower a t  the 
launching s i te  and the vehicle, the so-called swing arms. Again, it  
would go too fa r  into detail  to descr ibe the functions of each swing a r m  
and the environmental conditions under which i t  had to work. 
Huntsville a swing a r m  tes t  facility where all swing arms will be tested 
under var ious wind conditions and under cryogenic conditions a s  to their  
qualification, timing of their  re t ract ion,  disengagement f rom the vehicle, etc 
It is hard  to express  in reliability numbers  the influence of the 
We have a t  
testing on both facilities but we believe that i t  will increase  the confidence 
in re l iable  function of these components remarkably.  
5. C omDonent s 
In the field of components we adhere strongly to  NASA documents 
NPC 200-1, - 2 ,  and - 3  and NPC 250-1. Marshall  Space Flight Center ,  a s  
I mentioned before ,  was instrumental  i n  setting up these documents. The 
concepts spelled out in them a r e ,  in m y  opinion, some of the keystones 
for  achieving high reliability. I would like to d i rec t  your attention to 
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two salient points in those documents which I personally believe a r e ,  
I among o thers ,  very  important.  These a re :  in-process  inspection and the 
application of prefer red  par t s  l i s t s .  
A 100% in-process  inspection, if thoroughly conducted everywhere, 
expecially in the plants of our subvendors, i s  quite expensive. 
I feel  i t  should be applied on all cr i t ical  components. 
However, 
When detail design begins, we require that the pa r t s  used in the 
design be selected f rom the Marshall  Space Flight Center  P r e f e r r e d  P a r t s  
Lis t ,  PPD-600,  o r  MIL-STA-143, in that o rde r  of preference.  This 
s e r v e s  two purposes: standardization ac ross  the total launch vehicle 
with the result ing reduction in qualification testing required and the 
assurance  that only par ts  with known reliability his tor ies  a r e  used. 
course ,  these l i s t s  have to be kept up-to-date. 
Of 
In the a r e a  of mechanical components, our main trouble maker s  a r e  
s t i l l  cryogenic valves,  p r e s s u r e  switches, r educe r s ,  long cryogenic l ines 
of la rge  d iameters ,  expansion joints,  pipe connections - the ever -present  
leakage problem - and welding problems of high aluminum a loys involving 
la rge  d iameters  and ra ther  high precision. We t r y  to overcome these 
difficult ies by almost  daily exchange of experience between us  and the 
contractors  and their  subs. 
'r 
Marshal l  Space Flight Center  devotes considerable 
in-house efforts on the design of these components, on qualification testing 
and backup solutions. A s  to the welding problem, for instance,  we c a r r y  
out in our  shops, in cooperation with our  ma te r i a l  experts  and cont rac tors ,  
deve lopments of welding methods and conduct training of welders .  
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In this connection, we a l so  develop non-destructive inspection and tes t  methods. 
. i t  may be of interest  to you to know that we have a training program on 
non-destructive tes t  methods going on f o r  NASA a s  a whole, and executed 
by a contractor.  
A s  to  the e lec t r ica l  components, we have made extensive use of 
t r iple  redundancy with voting circui ts  which gives us a very  high inherent 
reliabil i ty for  the guidance and control system. The only place where 
such a redundancy scheme i s  not feasible is the stabilized platform in the 
Instrument Unit of the launch vehicle. Therefore,  we have introduced 
redundancy for  the stabilized platform by using the IMU (Inertial  Measuring 
Unit) in  the Apollo spacecraf t  command module as a backup. 
stabilized platform, for instance , of the Saturn V launch vehicle fa i l s ,  
In case  the 
the IMU can  take over f rom ignition of the S-I1 stage on through the whole 
launch vehicle operation. 
I 
Before we give the go-ahead for the f i r s t  flights of these big 
launch vehicles,  and af ter  a thorough design analysis of the components, 
we conduct a qualification tes t  program for the cr i t ical  components under 
all c r i t i ca l  flight environments,  which we t r y  to simulate a s  closely as 
possible.  We consider this tes t  program most  important and f rom it 
we expect to a r r i v e  a t  a proper confidence level for success .  Since, 
however,  the r e a l  function and quality of all components, subsystems,  and 
sys tems can only be proven by exposing them to flight conditions, we equip 
the f i r s t  flights with ample measuring devices. This is  especially 
important since we have only a few unmanned development flights f rom 
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which we have 
and function of 
to obtain a s  much knowledge as  possible about the behavior 
the vehicle and the rea l  environment during all flight phases .  
In our flight measuring program on Saturn I we te lemetered to  the 
ground around 1000 measurements ,  of which we lost  only 2 - 370, totally o r  
partially.  
with over 2000 measurements ,  which ought to give us  a l l  necessa ry  
information to judge the quality of the vehicle and i ts  components. 
something goes wrong or  some components function out of specified tolerances,  
we have to  know this.  
Otherwise we cannot da re  to go into manned flights. 
In the f i r s t  Saturn V flights we plan to equip the launch vehicle 
If 
Malfunctions have to be explained and then cor rec ted .  
F o r  the Saturn V we have allocated the following prel iminary reliabil i ty 
predictions o r  goals: 
* 95 
. 9 5  
. 9 5  
. 9 9 2  
. 9 5  
- F i r s t  stage s - IC  - 
Second stage s-I1 - 
Third stage s - IVB - 
- 
- 
- Instrument Unit IU - 
GSE - - 
These tentative figures a r e  based on test data  f rom known components, on 
a s ses smen t s  of l e s s  >nown components, on extended tes t  p rograms for  
engines,  on calculated cri t icali ty numbers,  and finally, on engineering 
judgment. They can be debated and, of course ,  cr i t ic ized.  F o r  instance,  
the S-IVB stage has  to be reignited in ear th  orbit  and has  to have proper  
ullage and attitude control over a longer period. I t ,  therefore ,  appears  that 
it ought to have theoretically a lower reliability than the other s tages .  On 
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the other hand, i t  has  only one main engine compared with five each  for 
, the other stages.  
Sometime in the program there wi l l  be the c ruc ia l  moment when 
management has  to decide which vehicle will be assigned the f i r s t  manned 
lunar landing mission.  
detailed reviews during which a l l  previous resul ts  of ground testing, 
analyses ,  qualification surveys,  quality a s ses smen t s ,  single point failure 
analyses ,  e t c . ,  will  be put on the table and scrutinized. Checkout procedures ,  
resu l t s  of countdowns of previous launches, and a l l  other operational 
procedures  will be reviewed. 
resu l t s  of previous unmanned vehicles, Finally,  with all this mater ia l  
on hand and af ter  thorough discussion with contractor and government 
personnel,  top program management will have to make a judgment 
whether confidence of all leading participants 
everything humanly possible has  been done to make the mission a success .  
Although reliability and crit icali ty figures will be strongly considered in 
coming to a conclusion, I do not think that the rationale will be,  and can 
possible be: 
This will be done after a s e r i e s  of thorough and 
Most important, of course ,  a r e  the flight 
high enough and whether 
"Since a predicted reliability figure, of say . 835 o r  . 8 7 7  or  s imi la r  
for the whole launch vehicle system, has been reached, we a r e  now ready 
to give the go-ahead, 
proven, we a r e  not ready,  
and management judgment of a few responsible top people. 
the contractor  - government engineering and program management team to 
or  conversely,  "Since such a figure cannot be 
In the final analysis  it will be the engineering 
It is the task of 
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have the proper mater ia l  prepared,  enabling top management to make this 
decision. 
Let  m e ,  a t  the end of m y  presentation, express  some few observations 
which I have made over long yea r s  on guided miss i les  and space launch 
vehicles,  and which I think a r e  worth being noticed in connection with 
the reliability effort: 
1. The inherent reliability of a launch vehicle is only a s  good a s  i t s  
design and engineering. 
lower ranks and younger, f reshly hired people with little experience.  The 
excellent and outstanding people have left the drawing board and laboratory 
long ago and have become managers  o r  salesmen.  Mostly, they do not 
involve themselves any more  in technical detai ls .  I believe this i s  to the 
detr iment  of this kind of complex technical program and to  the reliabil i ty 
problem as such. I believe the middle management - even up to the top 
level - should engage itself constantly, and not only in emergencies ,  in 
detail  design reviews detail  t es t  planning, detail supervision of r e su l t s ,  e tc .  
Excellent designers  and engineers should get incentives to s tay on the 
drawing board,  in active testing and in laborator ies .  
then come up with m o r e  reliable designs. 1 feel the good old designer  with 
novel ideas who lives with his task and is proud of his  accomplishment has  
become a figure of the past .  He is  replaced more  and more  by reliabil i ty 
philosophies, computers management experts ,  sa lesmen,  representat ives ,  
e tc .  
This i s  very  often conducted by personnel in the 
I am su re  we would 
We ought to educate hard core designers and engineers  again. 
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2 .  The technical difficulties in  a l l  these programs a r e  found, 
. almost  without exception, in subsystems and components. They are 
mainly procured f rom subvendors who often have difficulties keeping 
their  sma l l  shops financially out of trouble. 
therefore ,  bid low. These subcontractors should be more  careful ly  
selected,  especially as to their  technical capability. After award of 
contract  and right f rom the outset they should be m o r e  closely monitored 
and m o r e  often visited by the leading design, t e s t ,  and quality engineers 
of pr ime contractors  and Government. 
penetration of subvendors by Government and pr ime contractor personnel 
is a "must" because these subvendors in their  struggle to meet  schedules 
and cos ts ,  being under fixed pr ice  contract ,  r e s o r t  frequently to shortcuts ,  
sloppy work, f ixes,  neglect of proper  cleaning and packaging for shipment, 
deletion of t e s t s ,  and the like. 
3 .  
They need the job badly and 
Stronger day to day technical 
This is  to the detr iment  of reliabil i ty.  
When funds have to be reduced, the l a s t  thing which should be done 
is to cut down on tes t  facil i t ies and equipment and on the planned volume of 
testing. 
dangerous.  
p rograms"  because it is always debatable what this minimum is.  I hate 
to see  money saved, for instance,  f rom development testing in order  to  
buy immature  and unqualified long l ead  t ime hardware in grea t  quantities. 
Elimination of inspection and quality control procedures is equally 
We a t  Marshal l  do not believe in so-called "minimum tes t  
4. Don't, on the other hand, over-inspect and over - tes t  flight 
This i s  equally hostile to reliability and reduces liftime of hardware .  
components, for instance,  too much static firing of flight s tages  o r  engines. 
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5. If, during testing o r  checkout of a component o r  a s tage,  . 
, there  occurs  an unexpected and i r regular  function which does not show up 
any m o r e  in a repeat tes t ,  don't let  it  pass.  
means ,  be investigated and then corrected and documented, if necessary .  
1 have seen it happen quite often that during a cer ta in  s t ep  of a checkout a 
r ed  light would flash. 
again, everybody was happy, The checkout proceeded and was finally 
declared successfully accomplished. 
and tes t  concept. 
6 .  
The cause should, by all 
The tes t  was repeated. When red did not appear 
This is against an  integer checkout 
Although I feel  we a l l ,  together with our contractor  family,  
constitute a pretty good team in the Apollo program,  I s t i l l  believe - and 
I think this goes for other programs,  too - that we can improve in communica- 
tion as to: 
Exchange and acceptance of experience. 
Collecting and t ransfer  of tes t  data. 
F r a n k  submission of failure and unsatisfactory condition repor t s .  
Closing the loop by reporting corrective action 
Uninhibited admission and reporting of shortcomings and weaknesses 
in components and sys tems.  
Data and experience exchange with other programs and agencies 
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There a r e  many more  such items in the line of communication, 
’ where improvement ought to be achieved. 
I honestly believe that this l a s t  point which I have been trying to 
make represents  the most  important factor in achieving high reliability 
in such a program a s  the Apollo. I 
# 
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